The Impact of the Market Information Service on Pricing Efficiency and Maize Price Transmission in Uganda by Mugoya, Mainza et al.
 
WP 2007-12 
August 2007 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York  14853-7801  USA 
 
 
 
The Impact of the Market Information 
Service on Pricing Efficiency and Maize 
Price Transmission in Uganda 
 
Mainza Mugoya, Ralph Christy, and Edward Mabaya 
 
 
 
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of 
educational and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied 
admission to any educational program or activity or be denied 
employment on the basis of any legally prohibited discrimination 
involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, 
national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap.  The University is 
committed to the maintenance of affirmative action programs which will 
assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 
Abstract 
Agricultural market information such as commodity prices, trade volumes and 
weather conditions, plays an important facilitating role in improving the performance of 
markets. This research assesses the impact of the agricultural Market Information Service 
(MIS) on the performance of maize markets in Uganda. Specifically, the research 
analyzes two performance criteria - pricing efficiency and price transmission for three 
pairs of markets that trade in maize – three supply markets and one consumer market – 
over a period of 11 years from 1995 to 2006. The overall conclusion from the research is 
that the MIS positively influenced market performance in all three market pairs on two 
broad fronts. First, after the MIS was implemented, a larger portion of the price changes 
in the consumer market was transmitted to the supply markets, and at a greater speed. 
Second, with improved access to information, traders responded to opportunities to 
arbitrage, and as a result generated an additional US$ 1.8 million in 2004. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) Foodnet project 
established a decentralized agricultural Marketing Information Service (MIS) in May 
1999 with the objective of improving market access and efficiency, and increasing 
competition in food crop markets. The project collects, tabulates, analyzes and 
disseminates market intelligence to the farming and trading community on a timely and 
accurate basis (Okoboi, 2001). The service became operational in September 1999, 
collecting information on market prices and trade volumes for 32 crop and livestock 
products from 17 markets scattered across the country. The information was disseminated 
through the daily newspapers, e-mail and later by mobile phone. Eight years have passed 
since the establishment of the MIS in Uganda. However, empirical work has not 
determined whether the service has improved the performance of food crop markets. 
 The central objective of this research is to assess the impact of the MIS on the 
performance of maize markets in Uganda. The study analyzes weekly maize price data 
from the first week of 1995 to the 25th week of 2006 for three supply markets - Masindi, 
Kasese and Mbale, and one consumer market, Kampala. Specifically, this study examines 
two questions: (i) what has been the impact of the MIS on the transmission of prices 
between the three pairs of markets? And (ii) what has been the impact of the MIS on the 
level of pricing efficiency between the three pairs of markets?  
Two data sets are central to this analysis; maize price data and inter-market 
transfer cost data. Weekly market price data for maize for the time period noted above 
have been obtained from two sources. The price data for 1995 to the fourth week of 1999 
comes from a public online source http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds/xceltheme.php, 
managed by FEWS NET’s Africa Data Dissemination Service. The original source of 
those data was the Ministry of Trade in Uganda. The second portion of the data from 
week 40, 1999 to week 25, 2006 was obtained from the office of IITA Foodnet in 
Kampala, Uganda. Transfer cost data are for a point in time, and are extrapolated to form 
a time-series over the entire data set. Two empirical models are used to address the 
objectives of the research. The Houck model will measure the impact of the MIS on the 
dynamics of price transmission; more specifically, the magnitude and speed of price 
transmission before and after the implementation of the MIS. An Ordinary Least Squares 
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(OLS) linear regression model is developed to measure the unit impact of the MIS on 
price difference, and therefore efficiency. 
Maize supply chain in Uganda 
 Uganda’s maize supply chain consists of two channels. The first channel is of 
maize grain as a final product, the second channel is of maize flour as a final product, and 
maize as an input in flour production. This paper focuses on the former. In a typical year, 
about 15 percent of the total maize production is lost at this stage during post-harvest 
activities. A further 20 percent of the total production is consumed as subsistence 
(RATES). An estimated 65 percent of the total maize produced annually is traded. The 
traders can be described in three categories; rural, urban and large scale. Rural traders are 
located near the producing areas, and link directly with the farmers. They traverse the 
producing areas on bicycles, motorcycles or small vehicles purchasing maize at the farm 
gate. The purchased maize is taken to a central point in the urban towns, and then sold to 
urban traders. The main functions of the urban traders are to collect the maize, pre-clean 
it, bulk it and store it. The urban traders own or rent large trucks and are a major link to 
final markets. They supply the major wholesale markets of Kampala, major institutions, 
and to a small extent, they are involved in regional export.  
Urban traders are an important link to large-scale traders who are mainly 
engaged in export. Large-scale traders operate under an umbrella company called Uganda 
Grain Traders Limited (UGT). The major function of UGT is to source export 
opportunities for Ugandan maize in the region. Domestically traded maize grain is finally 
sold in urban or rural fresh markets. The leading maize grain markets in Kampala are 
located in the city centre at Owino, Nakasero and Kisenyi markets. This research will 
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focus on the interactions of urban traders between the three major maize supply markets 
of Masindi, Mbale and Kasese; and the major consumer market of Kampala. 
 
2.0 Impact of the MIS on Price transmission 
2.1 Model development 
Transmission of price adjustment measures the flexibility with which price 
changes are transmitted across markets. In perfectly competitive markets, price increases 
should be transmitted to the same extent as price decreases. In practice, markets are not 
perfectly competitive and prices are not always transmitted symmetrically. Symmetry in 
price transmission is measured two-fold, in magnitude and speed. The magnitude of price 
transmission measures the size of the increase or decrease that is transmitted from one 
market to another. For perfectly integrated markets, both an increase and a decrease 
should be fully transmitted. The speed of transmission refers to the time it takes for the 
increase or decrease to be transmitted. In the case of wholesale to retail relationships, 
there is usually a lag in price response due to the time required to collect and transport 
commodities from one market to another. 
A model of asymmetric transmission was initially developed by Rudolf, but the 
version in equation (1) was specified by Houck (1977). The model involves regression of 
the cumulative price differentials on the two lagged cumulative price differentials - 
negative and positive differences. 
(1) ∑
=
m
t 0
Δ Pj, t = a1∑
=
m
t 0
 Δ P1i,t + a2∑  Δ P11i,t + ξ 
=
m
t 0
 t = 1,2,3….m 
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Where ∑
=
m
t 0
Δ Pj,t = ∑
=
m
t 0
 (Pj, t – Pj,t-1) is the cumulative first price difference at market j; a1∑
=
m
t 0
Δ 
P1i,t = summation of the price difference (Pi,t – Pi,t-1) at market i if the difference is 
positive (Pi,t > Pi,t-1) and 0 otherwise; a2∑
=
m
t 0
Δ P11i,t = summation of the price difference (Pi,t 
– Pi,t-1) at market i if the difference is negative (Pi,t < Pi,t-1) and 0 otherwise. The 
estimates, ai, (i = 1, 2) show the cumulative impact of a rise or fall in the independent 
variable at a given time t1. The coefficients (a1 and a2) measure the magnitude of price 
transmission, for rising (i = 1) and falling (i = 2) prices. The speed of price transmission 
denoted by the average lag (θ), is measured from the following equation derived from 
Rao and Miller (pp.175).  
 (2)  yt = αxt + δxt-1 + βyt-1 + ξt 
The average lag implied by equation (2) is computed as: 
(3) θ = δα
δ
+  + β
β
−1  
Granger causality tests are usually carried out as a prelude to undertaking price 
transmission tests. The causality tests are useful for measuring the direction of price 
causality. And price causality is important to determine which prices in the market 
relationship cause the other, in other words, in which market do price shocks originate. 
Results from causality tests are useful in developing the specific models for price 
transmission tests. The focus of this research will not be on the symmetry in magnitude 
and speed of price transmission, but rather comparing both the magnitude and speed of 
price transmission before and after the MIS was implemented. 
                                                 
1 Appendix 1 provides an example of how the different variables in the model are calculated. 
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Following Houck (1977), the price transmission equations are specified to capture the 
separate effects, if any, of price increases and price decreases in one market on price 
adjustments in another market. For example, how do prices in Masindi respond to price 
changes in Kampala? Thus, the observations on the dependent variable are the 
differences between the initial price and the current price in time t, e.g., for Masindi. The 
right-hand side prices, say for Kampala, are specified as two variables, the cumulative 
sums of the positive and negative price changes, respectively. A set of three equations is 
fitted for each market pair: Kampala-Masindi, Kampala-Kasese, and Kampala-Mbale. In 
each set, separate equations represent the time periods before and after (pre and post) the 
MIS was implemented.  
The Granger causality tests showed that the causality was bi-directional. Following 
this result, price transmission tests should be carried out for both “directions” of 
causation (see Appendices 2a-f for detailed Granger Causality test results). That is, 
changes in Kampala prices causing changes in prices in the supply markets, and vice 
versa, changes in the prices in the supply markets causing changes in Kampala prices. 
Due to the endogeneity of the price variables, the results would be similar. Therefore, for 
this research, price transmission tests are done for one direction – from Kampala to the 
three individual supply markets. Specifically, measuring what percentage of the price 
changes in Kampala is transmitted to the supply markets, and at what speed.  
The pre and post equations are fitted with the Masindi, Kasese, and Mbale price 
changes2 respectively as dependent, and the cumulative positive and negative price 
changes in Kampala as independent variables. Each equation specification also includes a 
trend term, which in the Houck specification represents the intercept, and the lagged 
                                                 
2 Price changes refer to the difference between the price at time t and the price at time t-1 
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dependent variable. The full set of variable definitions is given in Table 1. The models 
specifically answer the following two questions: (i) Has the magnitude of price 
transmission increased or decreased after the implementation of the MIS? And (ii) Has 
the speed of price transmission increased or decreased after the implementation of the 
MIS? 
    Table 1: Definition of variables 
Variable Unit Description 
KDPre-upt UShs/kg Kampala price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, before MIS 
KDPre-upt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Kampala price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, before MIS 
KDPre-downt UShs/kg Kampala price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, before MIS 
KDPre-downt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Kampala price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, before MIS 
MD3Pret UShs/kg Marketi price difference before MIS 
MDPret_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference before MIS 
MDPre-upt UShs/kg Marketi price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, before MIS 
MDPre-upt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, before MIS 
MDPre-downt UShs/kg Marketi price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, before MIS 
MDPre-downt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, before MIS 
KDPost-upt UShs/kg Kampala price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, after MIS 
KDPost-upt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Kampala price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, after MIS 
KDPost-downt UShs/kg Kampala price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, after MIS 
KDPost-downt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Kampala price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, after MIS 
MDPostt UShs/kg Marketi price difference after MIS 
MDPostt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference after MIS 
MDPost-upt UShs/kg Marketi price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, after MIS 
MDPost-upt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference if difference is > 0; else 0, after MIS 
MDPost-downt UShs/kg Marketi price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, after MIS 
MDPost-downt_1 UShs/kg Lagged Marketi price difference if difference is < 0; else 0, after MIS 
ε1t and ε2t  Residual terms 
 
An example set is given in equations (4) and (5) below. 
                                                 
3 Marketi (MD) refers to the three supply markets Masindi, Mbale and Kasese. 
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 (4) MDPret = a1∑
=
m
t 0
KDPre_upt + a2∑KDPre_downt + a3
=
m
t 0
∑
=
m
t 0
KDPre_upt_1 + 
 a4 KDPre_downt _1 + a5MDPret _1 + a6Trend + ε1t ∑
=
m
t 0
(5) MDPostt = b1∑
=
m
t 0
KDPost_upt + b2∑KDPost_downt + b3
=
m
t 0
∑
=
m
t 0
KDPost_upt _1 + 
 b4 KDPostt_1 + b5MDPostt_1 + b6Trend + ε2t ∑
=
m
t 0
 
The estimates, ai and bi (i = 1, 2) show the cumulative impact of a rise or fall in the 
independent variable at a given time t. Those coefficients measure the magnitude of price 
transmission, for rising (i = 1) and falling (i = 2) prices. For equations (4) and (5), the 
speed of price transmission denoted by the average lag (θ) is computed as: 
(6) θ = 
21
2
ηη
η
+  + 5
5
1 η
η
−  where η = a, and b for the pre and post equations 
respectively. 
2.2 Results from Price Transmission tests 
Equations (4) and (5) were estimated by OLS, and then tested for any violations 
of the OLS assumptions using Stata (Version 9) statistical software. For all of the 
equations, the estimates violated the assumption of homoskedasticity and were corrected 
using generalized least squares (GLS), and the estimates are reported. All equations had 
high R-squared values between 0.88 and 0.96 signifying that the models fit the data well. 
The results are presented under the two categories: pre-MIS, that is before the MIS was 
implemented and post-MIS, after the MIS was implemented. In total, six equations are 
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estimated, two each for the three market pairs. The results of the price transmission tests 
are presented in Table 2. 
In all of the six market combinations, the magnitude of price transmission in the 
post-MIS period is greater than the magnitude in the pre-MIS period.  Consider the first 
row of results from Table 2.2 - rising prices in Kampala regressed on changes in Masindi, 
as an example. Before the MIS was implemented, a unit increase in the price of maize in 
Kampala led to a 22 percent increase in the price of maize in Masindi. After the MIS was 
implemented, a unit increase in the maize price in Kampala led to a 54 percent increase in 
the maize price in Masindi. 
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Table 2: Results from Asymmetry tests 
GLS Results Dependent 
variable 
Variables/ indicators 
Pre-MIS Post-MIS 
Kampala rising  0.2181** (0.0977) 0.5430* (0.1532) 
Kampala falling -0.0295 (0.0769) 0.2392** (0.0861) 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.9101 0.9315 
Kampala rising (average lag)  4.8 2.4 
Masindi 
Kampala falling (average lag) 6.1 4.6 
Kampala rising  0.0981 (0.0781) 0.3119** (0.1361) 
Kampala falling -0.1638 (0.1109) 0.1699 (0.1052) 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.9204 0.8835 
Kampala rising (average lag)  3.1 3.7 
Kasese 
Kampala falling (average lag) 4.9 3.6 
Kampala rising  0.1874** (0.0816) 0.3612* (0.0904) 
Kampala falling -0.0006 (0.1086) 0.2741* (0.0790) 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.9599 0.9300 
Kampala rising (average lag)  7.4 4.8 
Mbale 
Kampala falling (average lag) 9.2 6.0 
* Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
This finding implies a larger proportion of changes in maize prices in Kampala 
was transmitted after the implementation of the MIS, than before. The results are similar 
in the other two markets. The price share for rising prices received by the traders in 
Kasese and Mbale increased from 10 percent to 24 percent and from 19 percent to 36 
percent respectively. In all three cases, the traders in the three supply markets (Masindi, 
Kasese and Mbale) were the beneficiaries of this increase. Conversely, a larger portion of 
falling prices in Kampala was transmitted to traders in the supply markets. This implies 
that when prices fall in Kampala, a larger magnitude of that fall was transmitted to the 
supply markets after the MIS was implemented.  
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It is important to note that the percentage change (increase or decrease) is not 
entirely to the supply traders’ benefit (or loss). The prices are also transmitted further 
down the supply chain to other players like small rural traders and eventually farmers. 
This means that, although traders in the supply markets receive a larger portion of price 
changes, those changes may also be transmitted to other beneficiaries. However, due to 
the unavailability of data, the magnitude of price transmission further down the chain is 
not calculated. 
In five out of the six market combinations, the speed of price transmission 
increased in the post-MIS period. This implies that since the implementation of the MIS, 
price changes are transmitted from Kampala to the supply markets faster. The results in 
both dynamics (magnitude and speed of transmission) are positive for maize traders. Not 
only do they receive higher prices after the implementation of the MIS, these prices are 
received within a shorter amount of time. However, the caveat to this finding is that trade 
must take place. 
 
3.0 Implications of the MIS on pricing efficiency 
Efficiency is a measure of performance, and can be described in three categories. 
Technical efficiency refers to the effectiveness with which a given set of inputs are used 
to produce outputs. Operational efficiency refers to a reduction in costs without 
necessarily affecting the output side. The third category, which will be the focus of this 
research, is pricing efficiency or allocative efficiency. Market systems that are price 
efficient are able to allocate resources in accordance with consumer preferences. In other 
words, prices fully represent consumer preferences, and the market system directs 
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resources from lower to higher-valued uses. The goal of pricing efficiency is efficient 
resource allocation (Kohls and Uhl, 37). Under a free market economy, private players 
are expected to arbitrage by transferring commodities from lower-priced regions to 
higher-priced regions and in so doing, exploit profit opportunities and maintain 
equilibrium. A large portion of the literature often refers to pricing efficiency as market 
efficiency.  
Under the neoclassical paradigm, competitive market equilibrium is the condition for 
spatial market efficiency. Barrett and Li (2002) define competitive market equilibrium as 
the condition in which “extraordinary profits are exhausted by competitive pressures, 
regardless of whether this refers to the physical trade flows between markets.” The 
concept implies there are no opportunities for profitable arbitrage if markets are in 
equilibrium. This is consistent with the First Theorem of Welfare Economics that 
guarantees that a competitive market will exhaust all of the gains from trade (Varian, pp 
555). This implies that an equilibrium allocation will be Pareto efficient. 
Considering two spatially distinct markets that trade in a homogenous commodity 
(i.e. are integrated), the price differential between these markets must be equal to the cost 
of transferring that commodity from one market to the other. If the price differential 
exceeds the transfer costs, we can expect trade to occur from the lower priced market to 
the higher priced market until equilibrium is restored. For competitive spatial 
equilibrium, two spatial arbitrage conditions must hold: 
 
(6) Pjt = Pit + Tjit  when trade occurs 
(7) Pjt < Pit + Tjit  when trade does not occur 
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Where Pit, Pjt refer to the price of a homogenous commodity at markets i and j 
respectively at time t; and Tjit refers to the transfer costs from market i to market j at time 
t. Equation (6) is referred to as the Law of One Price (LOP), and is the theoretical model 
around which most empirical models measuring efficiency are designed. 
 
3.1 Model Development 
The least squares model, specified in equation (8), is derived from the equilibrium 
condition for efficiency (see equation (6)). According to the LOP, markets are in 
equilibrium (or efficient) when the price difference between those two markets equals the 
cost of transferring a commodity from one market to another. Equation (8) uses regional 
price differences (PD) as the dependent variable, that is, the difference between Kampala 
and the individual supply markets. The intuition behind using PD as a dependent variable 
is that any factor that can trigger increased exploitation of arbitrage opportunities 
between a pair of markets should have a negative effect on the price difference. One such 
factor is information. It is expected that when price information is provided to the traders 
in the maize chain, they will trade appropriately (that is, transfer from a low-priced (Pi) 
market to a high-priced market (Pj)) and realize profit. As a result of exploiting this trade 
opportunity, one of five things will happen. One, the price in the low-priced market will 
increase (↑Pi, Pj remains constant); two, the price in the high-priced market will decrease 
(↓Pj, Pi remains constant); three, both prices will change (↓Pj, ↑Pi); four, the price in the 
low-priced market increases by a greater proportion than the price in the high-priced 
market (↑Pi > ↑Pj); and five, the price in the high-priced market decreases by a greater 
proportion than the price in the low-priced market (↓Pi < ↓Pj). In any of the five cases, the 
regional price difference will reduce.  
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(8) PDt = α0 + α1∑PDt-j + α2TCt + α3Seasonalityt + α4MISt +α5∑Rainfall +   
   α6Trendt + εt 
=
j
t 0 =
k
t 0
Where j is the number of lags for regional price difference, and k is the number of rainfall 
lags. 
 The independent variables in the model are expected to have an impact on the 
regional price difference by either influencing the price in the supply market or the price 
in the demand market. The variables include: lagged regional price differences, inter 
market transfer costs (TC), a dummy variable for seasonality, a rainfall variable, a trend 
term, and a variable for MIS. In order to determine how many lags of the dependent 
variable should be used in the final model, the regional price difference is first regressed 
on five lags. The estimate of unit transfer costs consists of two variable components: unit 
transport costs and non-transport costs. Non-transport costs consist of unit trader margins, 
labour costs and contingency costs. Trader margin represents the wage of the trader; 
labour costs cover activities such as loading and offloading the maize onto the 
transportation vehicles; and contingency costs include security, grain losses incurred 
during loading/off-loading, storage, vehicle repair and maintenance. The two components 
are extrapolated using time-series variables over the period of analysis4. TC is expected 
to have a positive impact on the regional price difference. As the cost of transferring 
maize from the supply regions to Kampala increases, according to the law of one price, 
the regional price difference is expected to increase.  
The seasonality dummy is expected to capture the seasonal effect of agricultural 
production and harvest on the regional price difference. The variable is one (1) for the 
months of June to August, December and January, and zero (0) otherwise. During those 
                                                 
4 The survey was undertaken between January and March 2002. The survey reports that the price of maize 
in Masindi at the time was UShs 110/kg. This price corresponds with week 10 in the time series Masindi 
price data. As a result, the time series transfer costs were extrapolated from week 10 in 2002. The estimate 
is extrapolated using two data sets. Transport costs are extrapolated using fuel prices (pump price); while 
non-transport costs are extrapolated using time series transport consumer price index. Refer to Appendix 3 
for an explanation of how the transfer costs were calculated. 
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months, it is expected that increased trading activity should lower the price difference 
until it is equal to inter market transfer costs. A limitation to this variable is that it 
assumes that the specified months will have a consistent impact on the price difference. 
In other words, if the harvest is expected during the months of June to August, the 
seasonality effect will not be captured in years when the harvest is irregular. This may be 
the case when either the rains are delayed, or if they start earlier than expected.  
To address this anomaly, seasonality was modeled using monthly rainfall data 
obtained from the annual Statistical Abstracts. There are two likely impacts of rainfall on 
the regional price difference. First, heavy rainfall may damage transport infrastructure 
and increase the cost of transferring maize from the supply regions to Kampala, and 
subsequently increase the price difference. In addition, heavy rainfall may also damage 
the crop in the field and/or in storage and result in shortages in the market, and therefore 
high prices. Second, “good” rains (at whatever time of the year) will lead to a good 
harvest, which would lead to lower food prices. It is important to note that the duration 
from planting to harvesting maize ranges from 3 to 4 months. Given the various likely 
impacts of rainfall on prices and price differences, 6 lags are included – from week 1 to 
week 3, and from week 12 to week 14. 
The MIS variable, measures the impact of MIS on the regional price difference. 
The variable has a value of 0 prior to week 40, 1999, and then increases linearly to 1 by 
Week 40, 2000, and has a value of 1 thereafter. In modeling this variable, two 
assumptions are made. The first assumption is that the MIS policy took one year (from 
week 40 in 1999 to week 40 in 2000) to reach its full impact on the market actors. The 
second assumption is that the policy has a linear impact, as opposed to an impact with an 
alternative functional form. This means that the adoption or utilization curve for the 
adopters of the MIS was linear. Appendix 4 is a graphical representation of the MIS 
variable.  The final model shown in equation (8) utilizes the entire price data set from 
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week 1 in 1995 to week 25 in 2006, including the 35 forecasted observations as proxy 
values for the missing data. 
3.2 GLS Results 
Table 3 shows the results from the OLS regressions of the regional price 
difference on the various independent variables. The assumption of homoscedasticity was 
tested using the Breusch Pagan/ Cook Weisburg test, and was rejected in all three models.  
 
Table 3: GLS Regression results for impact of MIS on efficiency 
Dependent variable (Regional price difference, PD) 
Kampala - Masindi Kampala – Mbale Kampala - Kasese 
Variables 
 
Coefficient Std errors Coefficient Std errors Coefficient Std errors 
PD lag (1st wk) 0.6931* 0.0588 0.7002* 0.0589 0.7007* 0.0793 
PD lag (2nd wk) -0.0540 0.0722 -0.0539 0.0732 0.0854 0.0726 
Seasonality 6.8746* 2.930 4.9175* 2.4273 4.1895** 2.4829 
Trend 0.0518 0.0363 0.0342 0.0346 0.0450 0.0309 
Transfer Cost -0.5180 0.7066 -0.2791 0.7076 -0.0398 0.5270 
MIS -8.906 5.9921 -7.1329 6.0001 -13.3386** 6.3246 
Constant 11.6202 16.3113 13.3108 16.7612 5.8486 15.3501 
R2  0.6422 0.6364 0.6330 
* Significant at 5% ** Significant at 10%; - Variables not included in regression 
 
The models were subsequently run using generalized least squares (GLS), and the 
results are reported in Table 3. The models are a fairly good fit, with R2 ranging between 
63 and 64 percent. Most of the results in Table 3.1 are expected. The important research 
variable, MIS is negative in all cases, but only statistically significant in the case of 
Kasese (however, the absolute t-ratio is greater than one (1) in the Masindi and Mbale 
cases). The negative sign implies that the MIS policy intervention resulted in a reduced 
price difference in all three markets. The low t-ratios imply that the impact was not 
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statistically significant in Mbale and Masindi. The size of the coefficients is also 
important. The MIS policy resulted in a reduction of between UShs/kg 7 and 13 in the 
three market pairs. Neither transfer cost nor trend is statistically significant in any of the 
markets. On the other hand, seasonality was found to be significant and positive in all the 
market pairs. 
3.3 Economic impact of the MIS on the Maize Industry 
The impact of the MIS on the economy is an estimate of how much revenue has been 
generated as a result of increased trade. Recall that the unit impact of the MIS, obtained 
from the least squares regression results in Table 3, signifies that more maize was traded, 
and as a result the price difference reduced. Figure 1 is a graphical explanation of how 
prices and quantity traded changed after the MIS was implemented. Using the figure, a 
detailed explanation of the derivation of the exact economic benefit ensues. 
 Consider two markets; market (M) that supplies maize to a consumer market - 
Kampala (K). Ss and Dd are the supply and demand curves for M, while ESs1, ESs2 and 
EDd are the excess supply and excess demand curves for Kampala. For ease of 
explanation and to keep the graphs simple, two assumptions are made: (i) there are no 
transaction costs to trade between market (M) and Kampala, and (ii) Market (M) is a 
small exporter of maize to Kampala, implying that exports from M are not sufficient 
enough to impact the maize price in Kampala – hence the perfectly elastic excess demand 
curve in Kampala5. The second assumption implies that the entire price change will be 
felt in the supply market (M), that is, the supply market traders realize the entire benefit 
of the MIS. In practice, the revenue benefit is shared between all the traders in the supply 
chain. 
                                                 
5 If market (M) was larger, then the excess demand curve would be less elastic, and the exports would 
influence the prices in both markets. 
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 Figure 1: Graphical explanation of Economic impact of MIS 
 
 Before the MIS was implemented, market (M) supplied quantity Qm1, but 
demanded Qm2, and therefore exported (Qm1-Qm2) to Kampala at price Pm1 (which equals 
Pk1 in the absence of transfer costs). Total revenue generated from trade during this 
period was represented by the area DEQm1Qm2. After the MIS was implemented, market 
M increased her quantity supplied from Qm1 to Qm3. This raised the price in market (M) 
from Pm1 to Pm2, and therefore the quantity demanded in market (M) reduced from Qm2 to 
Qm4. Exports to Kampala increased from (Qm1-Qm2) to (Qm3-Qm4). Increased exports led 
to a right-ward shift of the excess supply curve from ESs1 to ESs2. But since market (M) 
is a small exporter, Kampala price remains constant at Pk1. New trade revenue (not the 
change in trade revenue) for market (M) is represented by the area ABQm3Qm4. The 
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additional revenue as a result of the MIS would be the shaded area, that is, the difference 
between the two areas ABQm3Qm4 - DEQm1Qm2. Or, the sum of the areas of the three 
shaded rectangles – (ABCF + CDQm2Qm4 + EFQm1Qm3).  
 
For ease of calculation, the revenue generated as a result of the MIS is the sum of two 
area components, as shown in equations (9) and (10):   
(9) ABCF = [increase in price (Pm2 - Pm1)6] * [total exports after MIS (Qm3-Qm4)]  
(10) CDQm2Qm4 + EFQm1Qm3 = Δ in exports [(Qm3-Qm4)-(Qm1-Qm2)] * old price (Pm1) 
The data to calculate these areas are not all readily available, and therefore some 
assumptions are made. In equation (9), the increase in price is equal to the coefficients of 
MIS (as shown in table 3); total exports are calculated in the next subsection. Equation 
(10) has two variables – Δ in exports and old price. Due to the paucity of trade data, I 
assume that Δ in exports be 5%. That is, the exports increased by 5% after the MIS was 
implemented; and old price is calculated from the research data collected by the IITA 
Foodnet project. 
 
Calculation of export trade volume (Qm3-Qm4) 
There is no secondary information on the specific volumes of maize trade from the three 
supply markets to Kampala, and therefore estimates are made. Figure 2 shows how the 
estimates for trade volume are derived. 
 
                                                 
6 (Pm2 - Pm1) = the coefficient of MIS which is the change in regional price difference (assuming that the 
change is entirely due to an increase in the supply market price) 
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Figure 2: Deriving the volume of maize trade between the supply markets and Kampala 
in 2004 
 
Total maize production in 2004 was 1.3 million metric tonnes. According to the RATES 
survey report, the three supply areas – Masindi, Kasese and Mbale contribute 18 percent, 
9 percent and 23 percent to annual production respectively. The report also estimates that 
65 percent of what is produced nationally is traded. Several assumptions are made at this 
point. The first assumption is that 65 percent of what is produced by each of the three 
supply markets is traded. The next set of assumptions is the percentage of total traded 
output (for all three supply markets) that is destined to Kampala. Those percentage 
estimates are centered on the statistic that 50 percent of all traded maize is destined for 
Kampala. Using this indicator, the assumption is made that 70 percent of Masindi maize 
trade is with Kampala. The estimate is above the national average of 50 percent because 
of all the major producing regions, Masindi is the only region that does not export maize. 
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Since maize from Kasese is exported to Rwanda, the assumption is that 40 percent of 
maize from Kasese is traded with Kampala – slightly below the national average of 50 
percent. In the case of Mbale, the RATES report indicated that in 2003, there was no 
maize trade from Mbale to Kampala, and therefore the estimate of annual maize trade 
between the two areas is five (5) percent. The trade volume is therefore a product of the 
annual production and the various percentages shown in Figure 2. This calculation is 
expressed in equation (11) below. 
 
(11) Export trade volume = Annual production * % Production * % Traded *  
   % Traded with Kampala 
 
Using the Masindi example, the volume of maize traded from Masindi to Kampala would 
be: 1,350,000 * 18% * 65% * 70% = 1,105,650 metric tonnes. Table 4 shows the 
estimated traded volumes from each of the supply markets to Kampala, the unit impact 
(from the least squares regression results in Table 3), and the derived economic impact 
(total revenue). 
 
 21
 22
Table 4: Economic Impact of the MIS on the Maize Industry in Uganda 
(1) Estimated 
export trade 
volume  
(2) Unit 
impact a  
(3) Revenue b 
(1)*(2)  
 
(4) ∆ in 
exports = 5% 
of total 
exports (1)  
(5) Average 
price before 
the MIS  
(6) Revenue 
(4)*(5) d  
Total Revenue 
(3) + (6) 
Supply 
Market 
(‘000 kg) (UShs/Kg) (US$) c (‘000kg) (UShs/kg) (US$)e (US$) 
Masindi 110,565 8.906 508,622 5,528.25 197.8 755,693 1,264,315 
Kasese 31,590 13.339 217,653 1,579.5 204.9 223,662 441,315 
Mbale 10,091 7.133 37,180 504.55 218.5 76,188 113,368 
Total 152,246  763,455   1,055,544 1,818,999 
a MIS coefficients from Table 3 
b Revenue = area (ABCF) in equation (9) 
c US$ 1 = UShs 1,936 (Bank of Uganda, 2003/04) 
d Revenue = area (CDQm2Qm4 + EFQm1Qm3) in equation 
(10)
 
e US$ 1= UShs 1,447 (Bank of Uganda, 1998/99)
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The MIS resulted in US$ 1,818,999 being generated in revenue from additional trade 
from the three supply markets to Kampala in 2004. The economic impact is highest for 
trade between Masindi and Kampala because the survey reports indicate that the trade 
volume along that route is high, compared with the Kasese-Kampala and Mbale-Kampala 
trade routes. It follows that in other years, the revenue generated would depend on the 
amount of maize that is traded with Kampala from the three supply markets.  The 
findings shown in Table 4 imply that as a result of the information service, traders earned 
more revenue by engaging in trade. The progress report on the MIS project, by Okoboi 
and Ferris (2000) revealed that the cost of disseminating the information by radio was 
US$ 17,0007, which is equivalent to about two (2) percent of the estimated revenue 
benefits. The estimate does not indicate how the revenue was distributed between the 
Kampala traders and the traders in the three supply markets. In order to calculate the net 
benefits to the both sets of traders, various costs must be taken into account. For Kampala 
traders, the net benefit would be difference between the final price and the sum of the 
price at the various supply markets and the inter-market transfer costs. For traders at the 
three supply markets, the net benefit would be the difference between the respective 
market prices and the sum of the price of maize at farm-gate or from rural traders 
(depending on where the maize was procured), and the cost of transferring the maize 
from the procurement location to the respective markets. 
 
4.0 Research implications, conclusions and areas for future research 
                                                 
7 Report states that the cost was UShs 30,000,000 in 2000. Calculation in the text is made using a nominal 
exchange rate of US$1.00 = UShs 1,763 from the Bank of Uganda (2000/01) 
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The objective of this research was to assess the impact of the MIS on the performance of 
maize markets in Uganda using two empirical indicators – pricing efficiency and price 
transmission. The MIS positively impacted price performance in terms of an increased 
portion of price changes being transmitted further down the maize supply chain in all 
three market pairs. The speed of transmission of prices increased only in the case of the 
Kampala-Masindi market pair. The least squares model shows that the MIS has improved 
the level of efficiency. 
 
4.1 Implications 
Implications for Traders: Traders from three supply markets now receive higher prices 
than before the MIS was implemented. In addition, the reduction in the price difference 
after the MIS was implemented implies increased trading activity with Kampala, and 
therefore increased trade revenue of about US$ 1,818,999 per year. 
 
 Implications for Government: Increased trade revenue implies increased tax revenue for 
the government. In addition, increased trade implies a more efficient food distribution 
system. Food is more now efficiently transferred from areas of surplus to areas of excess 
demand. The increase in magnitude of price transmission implies that incomes are more 
equitably distributed than before the MIS was implemented. 
 
Implications for Sponsors: The positive results of the MIS in terms of increased trade 
revenue, better food distribution systems, and higher prices for traders down the supply 
chain augur well for the current sponsors – the IITA Foodnet program and the UNFA. 
These results should give impetus for continued funding of the programme. 
Impact on Consumers: The reduction in regional price difference implies that, holding all 
other factors constant, maize market prices for the final consumer in Kampala, are now 
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lower than before the MIS was implemented. In addition, increased trade implies an 
increase in the food availability. 
4.2 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
It is important to recognize that these results are obtained from price-based tests, 
and therefore the conclusions in regard to trade are only implied. The general conclusion 
is that the MIS has positively impacted the four maize markets in this analysis. Larger 
shares of prices are being transmitted down the supply chain, and more revenue has been 
generated by increased trade. However, there exists substantial opportunity to make more 
profit by arbitraging from the Masindi and Kasese markets to Kampala.  
 
Policy intervention should be directed in two areas. Firstly, there is need for continued 
support of the MIS programme from its current sponsors, the government or private 
traders, as there is evidence that price benefits are more evenly distributed. Secondly, in-
country trade should be encouraged. One proposal would be to disseminate market 
analyses to traders through Traders’ Associations to inform them of these revenue 
opportunities and encourage greater participation in trade. The priority locations for 
intervention are Masindi and Kasese, as the unit impacts from these two areas are highest. 
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Appendix 1: An example of how to calculate variables for the Houck model 
Weeks Pj,t Δ Pj,t ∑
=
m
t 0
Δ Pj,t Pi,t Δ P1i,t ∑
=
m
t 0
Δ P1i,t Δ P11i,t ∑
=
m
t 0
Δ P11i,t 
Week 1 10 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 
Week 2 12 2 2 4 0 0 -2 -2 
Week 3 9 -3 -1 5 1 1 0 -2 
Week 4 15 6 5 7 2 3 0 -2 
Weeks 5 12 -3 2 8 1 4 0 -2 
Week 6 14 2 4 7 0 4 -1 -3 
Weeks 7 14 0 4 6 0 4 -1 -4 
Week 8 19 5 9 8 2 6 0 -4 
Week 9 16 -3 6 10 2 8 0 -4 
Week 10 18 2 8 9 0 8 -1 -5 
 
∑
=
m
t 0
Δ Pj, t = ∑
=
m
t 0
a1 Δ P1i,t +  a2Δ P11i,t …………… Houck model ∑
=
m
t 0
Pj,t  Price at market j, at time t 
Δ Pj,t  Difference between price at time t and at time (t-1) at market j 
∑
=
m
t 0
Δ Pj,t Summation of the price difference (Pj,t – Pj,t-1) at market j. 
Pi,t  Price at market i, at time t 
Δ P1i,t  Price difference (Pi,t – Pi,t-1) at market i, if the difference is   
  positive 
Δ P11i,t  price difference (Pi,t – Pi,t-1) at market i, if the difference is   
  negative 
∑
=
m
t 0
Δ P1i,t Summation of the price difference (Pi,t – Pi,t-1) at market i if the  
  difference is positive  
∑
=
m
t 0
Δ P11i,t Summation of the price difference (Pi,t – Pi,t-1) at market i if the  
  difference is negative  
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Appendix 2a: Testing whether Kampala price changes “Granger cause” Masindi price 
changes* 
 
Equation: Masindit = α0 + α1Masindit-1 + α2Masindit-2 + α3Kampalat-1 + α4Kampalat-2 +  
α5Kampalat-3 +ξ1t 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs =     545 
                                                F(  5,   539) =  469.69 
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                R-squared     =  0.9238 
                                                Root MSE      =  22.695 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          |               Robust 
Masindi   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Masindi_1 |   1.018295   .0566089    17.99   0.000     .9070944    1.129496 
Masindi_2 |   -.127406   .0599986    -2.12   0.034    -.2452658   -.0095462 
Kampala_1 |   .2038378   .0483033     4.22   0.000      .108952    .2987237 
Kampala_2 |  -.0769351   .0580576    -1.33   0.186    -.1909819    .0371118 
Kampala_3 |  -.0562832   .0500376    -1.12   0.261    -.1545757    .0420094 
Constant  |   4.394795   3.995873     1.10   0.272    -3.454598    12.24419 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Variable definitions after Appendix 4.2f 
 
F-test: H0: Kampala_1= Kampala_2= Kampala_3=0 
F(  3,   539) =    6.07 
Prob > F =    0.0005 
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 Appendix 2b: Testing whether Masindi price changes “Granger cause” Kampala price 
changes 
 
Equation: Kampalat = β0 + β1Kampalat-1 + β2Kampalat-2 + β 3Masindit-1 + β 4Masindit-2  
  + β5 Masindit-3 +ξ1t 
 
Linear regression                                   Number of obs =     545 
                                                    F(  5,   539) = 1417.83 
                                                    Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                    R-squared     =  0.9224 
                                                    Root MSE      =  23.887 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          |               Robust 
Kampala   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Kampala_1 |   .9441239    .054958    17.18   0.000     .8361658    1.052082 
Kampala_2 |  -.0573948   .0564939    -1.02   0.310      -.16837    .0535804 
Masindi_1 |    .324003   .0476539     6.80   0.000     .2303928    .4176132 
Masindi_2 |  -.2353183   .0646705    -3.64   0.000    -.3623553   -.1082812 
Masindi_3 |  -.0042253    .042107    -0.10   0.920    -.0869391    .0784886 
 Constant |   12.93438   3.136289     4.12   0.000     6.773529    19.09522 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
F-test: H0: Masindi_1 = Masindi_2 = Masindi_3 = 0 
F(  3,   539) =   15.97 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Appendix 2c: Testing whether Mbale price changes “Granger cause” Kampala price 
changes 
 
Equation: Kampalat = δ0 + δ1Kampalat-1 + δ2Mbalet-1 + δ3Mbalet-2 + δ4Mbalet-3 +ξ3t 
 
Linear regression                                   Number of obs =     545 
                                                    F(  4,   540) = 1525.51 
                                                    Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                    R-squared     =  0.9208 
                                                    Root MSE      =  24.103 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          |               Robust 
  Kampala |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------   
Kampala_1 |   .8918865   .0265667    33.57   0.000     .8396997    .9440733 
  Mbale_1 |   .3379586   .0695105     4.86   0.000     .2014145    .4745027 
  Mbale_2 |  -.2021586   .0885623    -2.28   0.023    -.3761274   -.0281898 
  Mbale_3 |  -.0482406   .0625549    -0.77   0.441    -.1711213    .0746402 
 Constant |   9.005423   3.174535     2.84   0.005     2.769472    15.24137 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F-test: H0: Mbale_1 = Mbale_2 = Mbale_3 = 0 
F(  3,   540) =   11.58 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Appendix 2d: Testing whether Kampala price changes “Granger cause” Mbale price 
changes 
 
Equation: Mbalet = µ0 + µ1Mbalet-1 + µ2Kampalat-1 + µ3Kampalat-2 + µ4Kampalat-3 +  
  ξ4t 
 
Linear regression                                   Number of obs =     545 
                                                    F(  4,   540) = 1521.20 
                                                    Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                    R-squared     =  0.9384 
                                                    Root MSE      =  19.392 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------             
|               Robust 
    Mbale |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------+---------------------------------------------------------------                       
  Mbale_1 |   .9499824   .0205025    46.33   0.000     .9097079    .9902569 
Kampala_1 |   .1277557   .0463202     2.76   0.006     .0367659    .2187455 
Kampala_2 |  -.1097802    .056769    -1.93   0.054    -.2212954    .0017349 
Kampala_3 |   -.002229   .0440791    -0.05   0.960    -.0888166    .0843586 
 Constant |   7.696446   2.702583     2.85   0.005     2.387581    13.00531 
 
F-test:  H0: Kampala_1 = Kampala_2 = Kampala_3 = 0  
F(  3,   540) =    2.56 
Prob > F =    0.0542 
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Appendix 2e: Testing whether Kasese price changes “Granger cause” Kampala price 
changes 
 
Equation: Kampalat = θ0 + θ1Kampalat-1 + θ2Kampalat-2 + θ3Kampalat-3 + θ4Kaseset-1 +  
θ5Kaseset-2 + θ6Kaseset-3 + ξ5t 
 
Linear regression                                 Number of obs =     545 
                                                  F(  6,   538) =  995.25 
                                                  Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                  R-squared     =  0.9186 
                                                  Root MSE      =  24.486 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------             
|               Robust 
  Kampala |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------   
Kampala_1 |   .9937418    .056355    17.63   0.000     .8830389    1.104445 
Kampala_2 |  -.1196284   .0813454    -1.47   0.142    -.2794219    .0401652 
Kampala_3 |   .0356006   .0561295     0.63   0.526    -.0746592    .1458604 
 Kasese_1 |   .1296084   .0645993     2.01   0.045     .0027106    .2565062 
 Kasese_2 |   .0042059   .0971695     0.04   0.965    -.1866723    .1950841 
 Kasese_3 |  -.0743575   .0556952    -1.34   0.182    -.1837642    .0350491 
 Constant |    11.8843   3.286092     3.62   0.000     5.429153    18.33944 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F- test: H0: Kasese_1 = Kasese_2 = Kasese_3=0 
F(  3,   538) =    5.50 
Prob > F =    0.0010 
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Appendix 2f: Testing whether Kampala price changes “Granger cause” Kasese price 
changes 
 
Equation: Kaseset = λ 0 + λ 1Kaseset-1 + λ 2Kaseset-2 + λ 3Kampalat-1 + λ 4Kampalat-2 +  
λ 5Kampala-3 + ξ6t 
Linear regression                                  Number of obs =     545 
                                                   F(  5,   539) =  309.15 
                                                   Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                   R-squared     =  0.8562 
                                                   Root MSE      =  32.673 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |               Robust 
   Kasese |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------      
 Kasese_1 |   .7501458   .1367542     5.49   0.000     .4815092    1.018782        
 Kasese_2 |   .0899165   .1105729     0.81   0.416    -.1272901    .3071232 
Kampala_1 |   .2471784   .0894047     2.76   0.006      .071554    .4228028 
Kampala_2 |  -.0629537   .0994528    -0.63   0.527    -.2583164     .132409 
Kampala_3 |  -.0673144    .049288    -1.37   0.173    -.1641345    .0295056 
 Constant |   3.536061    4.71917     0.75   0.454    -5.734157    12.80628 
 
F-test: H0: Kampala_1 = Kampala_2 = Kampala_3 = 0 
F(  3,   539) =    4.66 
Prob > F =    0.0032 
Variable Definitions 
Name  Definition 
Kampala Kampala price at time t 
Masindi Masindi price at time t 
Mbale Mbale price at time t 
Kasese Kasese price at time t 
Kampala_i Kampala price lagged by week i, where i = 1, 2, 3 
Masindi_i Masindi price lagged by week i, where i = 1, 2, 3 
Mbale_i Mbale price lagged by week i, where i = 1, 2, 3 
Kasese_i Kasese price lagged by week i, where i = 1, 2, 3 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of Inter-Market Transfer cost 
 
Time period Fuel price (1) Transport cost 
(2) 
Transport CPI 
(3) 
Non-
transport cost 
(4) 
Inter-market 
transfer cost 
Week 1 A1 B1 C1 D1 B1 + D1 
Week 2 A2 B2 C2 D2 B2 + D2 
Week 3 A3 B3 C3 D3 B3 + D3 
Week 4 A4 B4 C4 D4 B4 + D4 
Week 5 A5 B5 C5 D5 B5 + D5 
Week 6 A6 B6 C6 D6 B6 + D6 
Week 7 A7 B7 C7 D7 B7 + D7 
Week 8 A8 B8 C8 D8 B8 + D8 
Week 9 A9 B9 C9 D9 B9 + D9 
Week 10 A10 B10 C10 D10 B10 + D10 
 
Notes: 
1. Data on fuel price (1) and transport CPI (3) are obtained from the Statistical Abstracts 
(UBOS) 
2. Taking week 4 as the week when the survey was taken, B4 and D4 are unit estimates 
for transport and non-transport costs reported in the survey. 
3. Calculation of Bi and Di (except B4 and D4) 
i. Bi = B4 +    
4
4
A
AAi −  
ii. Di = D4 +    
4
4
C
CCi −  
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Appendix 4: Representation of the MIS variable 
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